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PREVIEW; United States v. Sanchez: A Prolonged Traffic Stop
and the Scope of a Consensual Search
Danielle Dacus*
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was scheduled to hear
oral arguments in this matter on Wednesday, September 2, 2020, but
upon issuance of an order on August 21, 2020, the Court decided to
rule on the record and briefs alone. Caitlin Boland Aarab submitted
the briefs on behalf of the Appellant. Thomas Keoki Godfrey
submitted the brief on behalf of the Appellee.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The issues presented in this case are whether the Montana
Highway Patrol Trooper unconstitutionally prolonged Manuel Paz
Sanchez Jr.’s traffic stop and whether the Trooper had consent to
search the spare tire located in the vehicle.1
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Manuel Paz Sanchez Jr. was stopped for a traffic violation
by a Montana Highway Patrol Trooper.2 While the Trooper drafted
the traffic warning, he checked Sanchez’s license and rental vehicle
documents, and Sanchez waited in the Trooper’s patrol car.3 During
this time, the Trooper asked Sanchez questions regarding his travel
plans. 4 After issuing Sanchez a traffic warning, the Trooper
requested Sanchez’s consent to search the rental car for contraband.5
Sanchez provided both oral and written consent.6 While searching
the vehicle, the Trooper asked for specific consent to search the
spare tire located inside the vehicle to which Sanchez replied, “It’s
not my tire.”7 The Trooper proceeded to search the exterior of the
tire and eventually deployed a drug-detection dog that alerted to the
tire. 8 The Trooper then asked and received Sanchez’s consent to

*

J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of
Montana Class of 2022.
1
Opening Brief of Appellant at *10, 18, United States v. Sanchez, (9th Cir. Jan.
28, 2020) (No. 19-30248).
2
Answering Brief of the United States at *1, United States v. Sanchez, (9th Cir.
Apr. 13, 2020) (No. 19-30248).
3
Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *3, 5.
4
Id. at *4.
5
Id. at *5.
6
Id.
7
Id. at *6.
8
Answering Brief of the United States at *7−8, United States v. Sanchez, (9th
Cir. Apr. 13, 2020) (No. 19-30248).
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search the tire’s interior.9 The Trooper located Methamphetamine
inside the tire, and Sanchez was subsequently indicted.10
Sanchez brought a motion to suppress in the district court.11
The court held (1) the Trooper had reasonable suspicion to conduct
the traffic stop; (2) the Trooper did not unconstitutionally prolong
the stop because, immediately after the stop’s end, Sanchez
provided consent for the search; and (3) the search of the spare tire
fell within the scope of that consent. 12 Sanchez subsequently
pleaded guilty, preserving his right to appeal the motion to
suppress.13 Sanchez now appeals the denial of his motion.14
III.
A.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellant Manuel Paz Sanchez

Appellant bases his appeal on two issues: (1) the stop was
unconstitutionally prolonged because the Trooper lacked reasonable
suspicion to continue the stop after completing its mission; and (2)
the spare tire’s removal and search exceeded the scope of his
consent.15 On appeal, Appellant does not contest that the Trooper
possessed reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial traffic stop.16
Appellant argues that the traffic stop was unconstitutionally
prolonged by the Trooper’s request to search the vehicle after
concluding the traffic stop’s mission.17 Applying the Rodriguez v.
United States 18 standard, Appellant asserts the Trooper required
“reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an
individual” to continue investigating after completing tasks related
to the mission of the traffic stop.19 Appellant asserts the Trooper did
not possess the reasonable suspicion required and instead used drug
trafficker stereotypes to justify his continued investigation.20
9

Id.
Id.
11
Id. at *8−9.
12
United States v. Sanchez, No. CR 18-03-BLG-SPW, 2019 WL 1598621, slip
op. at *2−4 (D. Mont. Apr. 15, 2019).
13
Opening Brief of Appellant at *8−9, United States v. Sanchez, (9th Cir. Jan.
28, 2020) (No. 19-30248).
14
Id.
15
Id. at *10, 14.
16
Reply Brief of Appellant at *3, United States v. Sanchez, (9th Cir. Apr. 20,
2020) (No. 19-30248).
17
Id. at *3−5 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 353 (2015)).
18
575 U.S. 348 (2015).
19
Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *13 (quoting Rodriguez, 575
U.S. at 355).
20
Id. at *14−15 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355).
10
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Next, Appellant asserts that the Trooper’s removal and
search of the spare tire exceeded the scope of his consent. 21
Following Florida v. Jimeno,22 Appellant argues the scope of his
consent to search is determined by what is objectively reasonable.23
Appellant asserts that the Trooper’s removal and search of the rental
car’s spare tire exceeded this standard.24 Further, Appellant asserts
he did not expand the scope of the search and in fact limited the
scope when he responded to the Trooper’s request to search the tire
by stating, “It’s not my tire.” 25 Appellant finally argues his
statement consenting to the removal of the tire from its rim was only
provided after the Trooper’s initial unconstitutional search of the tire
and deployment of the drug-detection dog.26
B.

Appellee United States of America

Appellee argues (1) Sanchez’s constitutional rights were not
violated because the stop was not unconstitutionally prolonged; (2)
alternatively, the Trooper had reasonable suspicion to prolong the
traffic stop; (3) the search of the tire fell within the scope of
Sanchez’s consent; and (4) the drug-detection dog’s alert gave the
Trooper probable cause for the search of the tire.27
Appellee asserts the stop was not unconstitutionally
prolonged because the questions asked during the stop were relevant
to the mission of the stop and only 14 minutes elapsed from the time
of the initial stop to the time the Trooper requested consent to
search.28 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held a 14 minute
traffic stop to be an acceptable length of time.29 Further, Appellee
argues even if reasonable suspicion was necessary for the stop’s
extension, reasonable suspicion “is not a particularly high threshold
to reach.”30 Appellee asserts the impossibility of Sanchez’s answers
to the Trooper’s questions combined with the Trooper’s knowledge
21

Id. at *17.
500 U.S. 248 (1991).
23
Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *17−18 (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S.
at 250−51).
24
Id.
25
Id. at *18−20.
26
Reply Brief of Appellant at *12, United States v. Sanchez, (9th Cir. Apr. 20,
2020) (No. 19-30248).
27
Answering Brief of the United States at *9−11, United States v. Sanchez, (9th
Cir. Apr. 13, 2020) (No. 19-30248).
28
Id. at *13−14.
29
Id. (citing United States v. Turvin, 517 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008)).
30
Id. at *14, 16−17 (quoting United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074 (9th
Cir. 2013) (en banc)).
22
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of drug trafficker behavior provided reasonable suspicion to prolong
the stop.31
Next, Appellee argues the Trooper did not exceed the scope
of Sanchez’s consent because he provided voluntary oral consent
and signed the Montana Highway Patrol search form.32 Analogizing
this case to United States v. Gutierrez-Mederos,33 where the court
held the search of a locked panel and removal of a cardboard divider
fell within the scope of consent, Appellee asserts contraband is
typically not located in plain sight, and, therefore, it is reasonable
for a Trooper to look inside compartments when searching.34 Finally,
Appellee asserts the Trooper received specific consent to search the
tire’s interior and had additional probable cause to do so after the
drug-detection dog alerted to the tire.35
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Extension of the Traffic Stop

The Court must first address whether the Trooper
unconstitutionally extended Sanchez’s traffic stop beyond its
mission. Without independent reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, a traffic stop cannot be prolonged after the “mission” of the
traffic stop has been completed. 36 Additional inquiries may be
conducted during the course of the traffic stop, but cannot prolong
the stop “beyond the time reasonably required to complete the
mission.”37 Generally, the mission of a traffic stop is to ensure all
vehicles are being “safely and responsibly” operated on the
roadway.38 This often includes reviewing the validity of the driver’s
license and vehicle registration.39 After the officer finishes the tasks
related to ensuring the vehicle is being safely and responsibly
operated, the mission of the traffic stop is complete.40

31

Id. at *17−20.
Id. at *10, 23.
33
965 F.2d 800 (1992).
34
Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 2, at *21−23 (citing United
States v. Gutierrez-Mederos, 965 F.2d 800, 802−03) (9th Cir. 1992)).
35
Id. at *23−24 (citing Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013).
36
Opening Brief of Appellant at *12−13, United States v. Sanchez, (9th Cir. Jan.
28, 2020) (No. 19-30248) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 348,
356−57 (2015)).
37
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354−55 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,
407 (2005)).
38
Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *12−13.
39
Id.
40
Id.
32
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To prolong a traffic stop after the completion of its mission,
there must be independent reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. 41 “Particularized suspicion” from “objective and
reasonable inferences” of “specific, articulable facts” provides a
Trooper with reasonable suspicion.42 Objective and innocent facts
that are meaningless to the layperson can be the basis for suspicion
and further investigation.43 The Court must look at the totality of the
circumstances when determining if reasonable suspicion exists.44
While the Ninth Circuit will likely reach the same holding as
the district court did when it held the Trooper’s extension of the stop
to be constitutional, it will probably diverge from the district court’s
reasoning. The district court incorrectly focused on the
reasonableness of the time it took from the beginning of the stop
until the Trooper’s request to search instead of the time between the
completion of the stop’s mission and the Trooper’s request to
search.45 The district court relies on United States v. Turvin,46 where
the court determined 14 minutes to be a reasonable length for a
traffic stop, to hold Sanchez’s 14 minute stop similarly
constitutional. 47 However, the Ninth Circuit has stated that
Rodriguez abrogated Turvin’s reasonableness standard for the
extension of a traffic stop absent reasonable suspicion.48 Therefore,
the constitutionality of the stop is based on whether or not
reasonable suspicion existed to extend the stop after the completion
of its mission.49
After reviewing this case, the Ninth Circuit will likely hold
the Trooper possessed reasonable suspicion to prolong Sanchez’s
traffic stop. Before the Trooper issued the traffic warning, he
reviewed Sanchez’s driver’s license, rental car agreement, and
41

Id. (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356−57); Answering Brief of the United
States at *12, United States v. Sanchez, (9th Cir. Apr. 13, 2020) (No. 19-30248)
(citing United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779, 786 (9 th Cir. 2015)).
42
Evans, 786 F.3d at 788 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. MonteroCamargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
43
Answering Brief of the United States at *16−18, United States v. Sanchez,
(9th Cir. Apr. 13, 2020) (No. 19-30248) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 273−74 (2002); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
44
Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 2, at *16 (citing Arvizu, 534
U.S. at 273).
45
United States v. Sanchez, No. CR 18-03-BLG-SPW, 2019 WL 1598621, slip
op. at *3−4 (D. Mont. Apr. 15, 2019).
46
517 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2008).
47
Sanchez, 2019 WL 1598621 at *3−4.
48
United States v. Landeros, 913 F.3d 862, 866−67 (9th Cir. 2019).
49
Opening Brief of Appellant at *12−13, United States v. Sanchez, (9th Cir. Jan.
28, 2020) (No. 19-30248) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 348,
356 (2015)).
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conducted a criminal history and El Paso Intelligence Center
check.50 The Trooper, upon issuing the traffic warning, completed
the mission of the traffic stop and therefore, required reasonable
suspicion to continue the stop.51 Nevertheless, the Trooper likely
possessed the required reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop.
Sanchez’s impractical travel plan to drive further east than his end
destination and then fly to the end destination, as well as the
Trooper’s belief that the story was being made up on the spot,
created perceived inconsistencies in his story supporting reasonable
suspicion. 52 Further, the innocent objective facts that Sanchez
started his trip in Sacramento, a known drug-hub, and was driving a
rental car, a known transportation method for drug distributors, can
support reasonable suspicion when considered under the totality of
the circumstances. 53 Therefore, the Court will likely hold the
Trooper did not unconstitutionally prolong the stop because
reasonable suspicion existed to extend the stop.
B.

Scope of Consent

The Court must decide two key issues regarding the search
of the tire: (1) whether the original consent included the exterior of
the tire; and, (2) if it did include the exterior of the tire, whether that
consent was limited by Sanchez’s later statement.
When an individual consents to a search, reasonableness
determines the permissible scope of search.54 A Trooper may search
locations that are objectively reasonable when searching for the
stated item. 55 Contraband is not generally strewn throughout the
car.56 Therefore, when consent to search for contraband is provided,
containers such as paper bags 57 or locked compartments 58 are
50

Id. at *3−5.
Id. at *14 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355)
52
Answering Brief of the United States at *17−18, United States v. Sanchez,
(9th Cir. Apr. 13, 2020) (No. 19-30248).
53
Id. at *16, 19−20.
54
Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *17−18 (citing Florida v. Jimeno,
500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)).
55
Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249 (1991).
56
Reply Brief of Appellant at *21−22, United States v. Sanchez, (9th Cir. Apr.
20, 2020) (No. 19-30248).
57
Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *18 (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at
251 (holding the search of a paper bag located in the vehicle based on a consent
to search for narcotics to be reasonable)).
58
Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 2, at *22−23 (citing United
States v. Gutierrez-Mederos, 965 F.2d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding the
officer’s search of a locked compartment and removal of cardboard divider
when searching a vehicle based on consent to search for contraband to be
reasonable)).
51
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considered reasonable locations to search.59 Troopers do not need to
ask for subsequent consent to search items that are considered
objectively reasonable for the search they are conducting, because
they fall within the original scope of consent.60
After an individual has provided consent for a search, they
may subsequently limit the scope of their consent.61 Although the
Ninth Circuit has no precedent on what constitutes a valid
withdrawal of consent, it has previously referenced the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals’ definition when discussing the issue. 62
The Eighth Circuit has held that, similar to providing consent, a
withdrawal of consent is determined by what an objectively
reasonable person would understand from the statement or actions.63
Further, withdrawing consent cannot be ambiguous and must be
done using an unequivocal statement or action.64
Here, it is highly likely the Court will consider the exterior
of the spare tire to be an objectively reasonable location to search
for contraband. Sanchez consented to the Trooper’s search for
contraband. 65 Therefore, the scope of consent encompassed
locations within the vehicle that would be objectively reasonable to
search when looking for contraband. 66 Based on court precedent
allowing the search of the interior of various containers during a
consensual search for contraband, the exterior of any item within a
vehicle, including a tire, likely falls within the scope of consent.67
Additionally, the Court will likely hold Sanchez’s
subsequent response to the Trooper’s request for specific consent to
59

Id. at *21−22 (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251)).
United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 477 (9th Cir. 1994); Opening Brief of
Appellant, supra note 1, at *18 (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252).
61
Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *20 (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at
251−52).
62
United States v. Russell, 664 F.3d 1279, 1282, 1284 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing
United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 776 (8th Cir. 2005)).
63
Sanders, 424 F.3d at 774 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding the action of repeatedly
covering pockets during a consensual search to withdraw consent to search
pockets because reasonable person would understand this as a withdrawal).
64
Id. at 774−75; United States v. Gray, 369 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 2004)
(citing United States v. Ross, 263 F.3d 844, 846 (8 th Cir. 2001) (holding
statement about a search taking too long is not an unequivocal withdrawal of
consent)).
65
Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *5.
66
Answering Brief of the United States at *22−23, United States v. Sanchez,
(9th Cir. Apr. 13, 2020) (No. 19-30248) (citing United States v. GutierrezMederos, 965 F.2d 800, 803−04 (9th Cir. 1992)); Opening Brief of Appellant,
supra note 1, at *5, 17−18 (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251).
67
Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 2, at *22 (citing United
States v. Cannon, 29 F.2d 472, 477 (9th Cir. 1994)).
60
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search the tire did not limit the original consent. 68 Sanchez
consented to the search of the vehicle and, therefore, could limit or
withdraw his consent. 69 However, following the Eighth Circuit’s
standard, Sanchez’s statement, “It’s not my tire,” is unlikely to be
understood by an objectively reasonable person as withdrawing
consent because it is a statement regarding the tire’s ownership and
does not directly address the scope of the search.70 Further, as it does
not expressly limit the scope of the consensual search, it is unlikely
to be seen as an unequivocal statement withdrawing consent to
search the spare tire.71 Therefore, the Court will likely hold that the
Trooper’s inspection of the exterior of the tire was constitutional.
Since the inspection of the exterior of the tire was likely
within the scope of consent, the Trooper’s use of a drug-detection
dog on the exterior of the tire is also likely constitutional. Sanchez’s
unwithdrawn consent to search for contraband likely justified the
Trooper’s use of a drug-detection dog on the exterior of the spare
tire. 72 The positive alert from the Trooper’s drug-detection dog
provided probable cause to search the interior of the tire.73 Moreover,
Sanchez supplied specific consent to search the interior of the tire
by stating “[y]eah,” when asked by the Trooper if he could take the
tire to a nearby shop to remove it from the rim. 74 Therefore, the
Court will likely hold the search of the tire’s interior to be
constitutional.
V.

CONCLUSION

This case presents opportunities for the Ninth Circuit, first,
to solidify the Rodriguez rule that prolonging a traffic stop beyond
the stop’s mission requires reasonable suspicion, and, second, to set
precedent on what constitutes a withdrawal of consent. The Court
will likely hold that the Trooper had reasonable suspicion to prolong
the stop, making the stop’s extension constitutional. Additionally,
due to the broad scope of Sanchez’s consent to search for contraband,
the Court will likely hold the search of the exterior of the tire fell

68

Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *18−19.
Id.; Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 2, at *22.
70
Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *6.
71
United States v. Gray, 369 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing United
States v. Ross, 263 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 2001)).
72
Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 2, at *7−8.
73
Id. at *24 (citing United States v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237(2015)) (note: correct
citation for cited case is Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013)); Florida v.
Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013) (holding an alert from a reliable drug detection dog
provides probable cause).
74
Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 2, at *23.
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within the scope of the initial consent. Moreover, Sanchez’s
subsequent statement that the tire did not belong to him was not an
unequivocal withdrawal of consent. Therefore, the Court will likely
hold the scope of consent was not subsequently limited. Finally,
since the search of the tire’s exterior was likely constitutional, the
use of the drug-detection dog on the exterior is also likely
constitutional. The resulting probable cause from the drug-detection
dog’s alert along with Sanchez’s additional consent makes it highly
likely the Court will hold the Trooper’s search of the tire’s interior
to be constitutional. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit will probably
uphold the district court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress.

